The Central Area Transmission System (CATS) in the UK sector of t he North Sea del ivers natural gas t hrough a 404 km pipeline from the CATS riser plat form to the North East coast of England. During the summer of 2007 this 36 inch diameter natural gas pi peline was dam aged by a vessel anchor . The anchor lifted the pi peline from under t he seabed, dragged i t across t he seabed, bendi ng t he pi pe and locally deforming it. This event resulted in a sig nificant in spection, assessment an d repair program me before t he pi peline co uld safely retu rn to operation. This paper descri bes t he det ailed st ructural assessm ent of the damaged pipeline and the inspection and repair operations.
INTRODUCTION
The Central Area Transmission System (CATS) is a large diameter subsea natural gas pipeline in the UK sector of the North Sea, Figure 1 .
Figure 1 -CATS Pipeline Route
The pi peline i s operat ed by B P on behal f of the CATS partners. It transports gas approxi mately 400 km from t he central North Sea to a shore terminal at Teesside. The pipeline was installed in 1991-2.
The pi peline operat es i n dense phase with a maximum allowable operat ing pressure (M AOP) of 179 bar g. The pipeline is API 5L X65 steel grade, 36" out side diameter, wall thickness of 28.4 m m, and coat ed with 51 mm of hi gh density concrete. In the near shore area, the pipeline is trenched (with natural backfill) for stability and protection.
CATS PIPELINE INCIDENT
During the night of 25/ 26 June 2007, B P was notified that a large tanker moored off the Tees estuary in the North Sea had dragged her anchor across t he C ATS pi peline duri ng a st orm [1] . The i ncident occurred approxi mately 6 km from the pipeline l andfall by t he Tees est uary, i n a water depth of approximately 32 m.
INITIAL RESPONSE
Following the report of possi ble cont act bet ween t he anchor and the pipeline, the pipeline emergency response pl an was put into action, in accordance w ith BP's internal standards. Monitoring of t he flow and pressure i n the pipeline confirmed that there was no loss of containment as a result of the incident. A guard vessel was posi tioned near t he pipeline and a 1000 m radius exclusion zone designated around the damaged section.
BP's engineering t echnical pr actices refer to th e Pip eline Defect Assessment Manual (PDAM) [2] for guidance following pipeline incidents and pot ential damage. PDAM recommends that the pipeline pressure is reduced immediately following an incident in order to stabilise the pipeline. Ductile materials can exhibit t ime dependent behavi our and i t is possible that a damaged pi peline can fai l som e time after the incident, even though t here m ay be no subsequent i ncrease i n t he appl ied loading.
PDAM and ot her references recom mend pressure reductions between 5% and 20% before inspecting or worki ng on dam aged pi pelines. The dense phase C ATS pipeline operates above a m inimum cri condenbar pressure of 105 bar g and was operat ing at 112 bar g at the time and location of the incident. The pressure was t herefore reduced by 5% and monitored for 48 hours before inspecting the pipeline.
An Acergy survey vessel on contract to BP , the MV Polarbjorn, was diverted from its pl anned work t o perform a survey of t he pi peline usi ng si de scan sonar and a remotely operated vehicle (ROV). This survey revealed that the pipeline and i ts coat ing had been dam aged by t he anchor . The side scan survey i dentified t hat t he pi peline had m oved by a distance of approxi mately 4 t o 5 m t o t he south-east. The movement had pulled the pipe through the backfill soil and caused pipeline exposure over a 94 m l ength. B ased on disturbed seabed soi l, l ateral m ovement had occurred over a longer l ength of approxi mately 140 m. Anchor scars were clearly vi sible on t he si de scan sonar survey . The R OV vi deo survey showed wi despread dam age t o t he concret e coat ing of the pipeline, see Figure 2 . The pipeline concrete and underlying coal tar enam el coatings suf fered extensive dam age over approximately 4 m of the pipe and t he pi peline st eel was exposed in a number of areas.
The available video and still photography showed features that appeared t o be gouges i n t he pi pe wal l, ori entated i n t he longitudinal direction, and a possi ble dent i n t he pi peline, see Figure 2 . The pi peline was shut i n and the internal pressure was reduced t o 105 bar g whi le furt her i nspection works were planned. 
Side Scan Sonar

SAFETY ASSESSMENT
The ext ent of t he dam age requi red furt her det ailed inspection b y d ivers in o rder to assess th e integrity of the pipeline. An engi neering assessm ent was carri ed out to determine t he act ions requi red t o ensure safet y duri ng the inspection works.
Pressure Reduction
The initial inspection demonstrated th at th e p ipeline h ad suffered potentially severe damage. PDAM states that in som e circumstances, particularly when t he damage is very severe or there is th e p ossibility th at th e p ipeline m ay fail as a ru pture, additional consi deration shoul d be given t o reduci ng t he pressure to a l evel correspondi ng t o a hoop st ress of 30% SMYS. This 30% l imit i s based on experi mental evi dence which shows that a p ipeline is m ore likely to leak, rather than rupture, if the hoop st ress is below 30% of t he SMYS. In this context a rupture is a failure where the opening of the pipe wall extends beyond the extent of t he ori ginal defect . Pressure reduction to th is lev el red uces b oth th e p robability an d consequences of any failure.
The limit of hoop stress equal to 30% SM YS is based on onshore pipeline practice where pi pe l oading i s pri marily due to internal pressure. Offshore pi pelines m ay be subject ed t o other loads, such as bendi ng moments or axial forces. For the CATS pi peline, di ving works were necessary to expose the damaged section for i nspection. This i ncluded excavat ion of the t rench underneat h t he pi peline and concret e coating removal using a mechanized concrete removal tool mounted on the pi peline i tself. These operat ions would induce further bending of t he pi peline. The 30% st ress l imit was t herefore applied t o t he nom inal equi valent st ress (excluding local stresses at the deformed pipeline) rather than hoop stress.
The initial inspection indicated that approximately 20 m of pipeline would have to be excavated to allow adequate access to the damaged section. M aking allowance for t he tolerances of excavation by jetting, calculations based on a possi ble 30 m span gave an allowable pressure of 54 bar g. The pressure i n the pipeline was reduced t o this value by exporting gas to the UK transmission system as far as possi ble, followed by flaring of t he resi dual gas of fshore. Depressurisation of t he pipeline took place over more than a week.
Structural Analysis
The initial in spection in dicated th at th e p ipeline h ad seen significant deformations during the incident. The displacement of t he deform ed pi peline was m odelled usi ng fi nite el ement analysis (FEA) to understand the loads applied to the pipeline and t he st ress st ate wi thin t he pi pe, bot h duri ng and aft er t he incident.
The FEA requi red a num ber of unknown param eters, including the loads applied t o t he pi peline by t he anchor and the soil rest raint act ing on t he pi peline. The unknowns were estimated by com paring t he FEA predi ctions of pi pe posi tion and sh ape fo llowing th e ev ent ag ainst th e resu lts o f th e in itial survey. The results of the FE A (Figure 3 ) showed t hat t he pipeline had been pl astically deformed i n t he region of lateral displacement and revealed areas of high longitudinal stresses, both tensile and com pressive, in some areas of t he pipe. These stresses were part ially "l ocked-in" due t o the residual stress distributions ari sing from t he perm anent deformation of the pipeline. The predicted peak stresses were t ensile and cl ose to the yield strength of the pipe material.
The an alysis was ex tended to p redict how the stresses varied during the depressurisation and proposed excavation and inspection works. The FEA considered the additional loading induced by t he span, t he concret e removal tool, and potential lateral m ovement of t he pi peline duri ng this work. The FEA produced a det ailed m apping of t he act ual and predicted time history of stresses with in th e p ipeline. The resu lts fro m th is FEA were u sed in a p reliminary defect assessm ent to confirm the safety of the proposed inspection works.
Figure 3 -Example FEA Pipe Profile Preliminary Defect Assessment
A preliminary defect assessment was carried out to enable a deci sion t o be m ade on t he need t o repai r t he pipeline once detailed inspection data were available.
In accordance with BP' s engi neering technical practices, the defect assessment was performed using the Pipeline Defect Assessment Manual (PDAM). PDAM is a com pendium of t he "best" available methods for assessm ent of pi peline defect s based on a revi ew of publ ished assessm ent m ethods and test data.
The prelim inary defect asse ssment was perform ed for the pipeline MAOP of 179 bar g. As the state of longitudinal stress varied significantly around the circumference of the pipeline in the area of coating dam age, separate assessments were carried out for axial gouges subject t o i nternal pressure l oading and axial gouges subject to internal pressure and compressive axial stress.
The assessment of tolerable sizes for gouges in the areas of the pi pe wi th no si gnificant axi al st resses was straightforward using the methods recommended in PDAM, and showed that a gouge 275 mm in length and 4 m m in depth could be tolerated at the MAOP of the pipeline.
PDAM does not contain a m ethod for t he assessm ent of longitudinally-oriented gouges subject to internal pressure and axial com pressive l oading, as t here are no publ ished m ethods addressing t his defect and l oad combination. PDAM advises the user to seek specialist advice. The specialist advice provided by Penspen for t he CATS assessment was t o use the method recommended i n PDAM for t he assessm ent of a part wall corrosion defect subject to the same loading condition, and use the axial stress dependent term of this method to modify the standard m ethod for l ongitudinal gouges under internal pressure loading. Using t his m odified m ethod, Penspen produced defect acceptance charts which demonstrated that for the areas of the pipeline that were in ax ial co mpression, th e tolerable defect size was so sm all th at in p ractical term s an y gouges i n t hese areas of t he pi pe m ust be repai red before the pipeline could operate at MAOP, Figure 4 . A similar result was obtained for ci rcumferential gouges i n t he areas of highest tensile stress. These assessments conservatively considered the locked-in stresses t o be pri mary (ext ernally appl ied) st resses; no allowance was m ade for any rel axation of st ress due t o deformation.
Any defect assessment method will produce very sm all defect acceptance levels at these high stresses, as the m ethods used are 'flow stress' dependent, i.e. they cannot accom modate stresses much bey ond y ield, and at st resses approachi ng and beyond yield they produce vanish ingly small acceptable defect sizes. This does not present a si gnificant probl em for onshore pipelines because such lar ge ax ial stresses are rarely present; however, for subsea pi pelines t here i s t he pot ential for high locked-in com pressive st resses t o be generat ed as a result of pipeline displacement. The expe rience of the CA TS incident shows that there is a need for fu rther research to develop defect assessment methods that take account of these loads. 
Safety of Inspection Works
The high local stresses demonstrated that depressurisation to a nom inal equi valent st ress of 30% SM YS, although good practice, di d not necessari ly ensure integrity of the pipeline during excavation and i nspection. For exam ple, an increase in axial stress during ex cavation co uld still cau se failu re o f circumferentially orientated defects at the reduced pressure. A further defect assessment was m ade to confirm that the excavation and inspection works could proceed safely with no risk of pipeline failure.
The initial survey indicated a num ber of possible gouges and ot her defect s i n t he pi pe wal l. It was also possible that other gouges or defect s could have been present elsewhere on the pipeline b ut were n ot v isible in th e in itial su rvey. Giv en that the pipe defect s were unknown at t his st age, t he safet y assessment made use of t he principle of proof l oading, i.e. that any unknown defect i n t he pi peline woul d be safe ("proven") during t he excavat ion and i nspection works if it had already experienced a more onerous stress state since the incident.
The principle is illustrated in Fig ure 5 wh ich sh ows th e hoop and longitudinal stress pat h on depressuri sation superimposed on t he fai lure l ocus for t wo part wal l corrosi on defects. The stress paths correspond t o two worst-case defects which woul d have been on t he poi nt of failure prior to depressurisation.
The failu re locus follows a "Tresca" condition, i.e. tensile hoop and axial stresses can be consi dered independently, while tensile hoop and com pressive stresses are combined u sing a lin ear in teraction m odel. Dep ressurisation reduces both hoop and axial tensile stress, and generally moves the stress state away from th e failure locus. However excavation and inspection works i ntroduce furt her axi al stresses which m ay bring the stress state closer to the failure locus and may cause failure of a previously stable defect. The FEA results were used to demonstrate that the predicted loading history during excavation and inspection was acceptable for all areas of axial tensile stress following the incident, wi th an adequat e m argin of safet y. However proof loading could not be demonstrated in all areas of com pressive stress fo llowing th e in cident. After d etailed rev iew, th ese compressive stresses were conc luded to be acceptable because (i) these stresses occurred on the opposite side of the pipe from the anchor , and t herefore no gougi ng was expect ed at t his location, or (i i) any defect s of a pl ausible si ze coul d safel y withstand compressive st resses of t he predi cted m agnitude at the reduced pressure of 54 bar g. This prel iminary defect assessment therefore validated the earlier co nclusions th at excavation and inspection was safe at the reduced pressure.
INSPECTION OF THE DAMAGE
Following the reduction in pipeline pressure, remote jetting operations commenced from the MV Polarbjorn to excavate the damaged section of the pipeline. A more detailed visual survey was performed by ROV to assess t he pi peline condi tion i n more det ail. The det ailed R OV survey di d not show any further damage to the pipeline or coating other than that already reported. Diving operations subsequently commenced from the Technip DSV Orelia. The operat ions consi sted of a vi sual inspection of t he pipe, removal of t he concrete weight coating and coal tar corrosion coati ng from t he pi peline, and a comprehensive inspection of the suspected damage, see Figures 6 & 7.
A mechanical coating removal tool was used to remove the concrete coat ing and rebar , fo llowed b y lo w pressure water jetting to remove the coal tar enamel. The work was performed carefully over a period of several day s and com pleted successfully.
The scope of the subsequent i nspection i ncluded cl ose visual inspection of the pipeline, detailed geometrical mapping using out of straightness an d o vality m easurements with specially manufactured taut-wire and ovality jigs, MPI and UT inspection of al l wel ds (i ncluding t he l ongitudinal seam weld and ci rcumferential wel ds on ei ther si de of the damaged section), fu ll UT wall th ickness su rvey, and measurement of any defects discovered. Diver access and detailed insp ection on the pipe gave unexpected resul ts. The suspect ed gouges i n t he pi pe t urned out to be gouges in the coal tar enamel coating only which had subsequently filled with d ebris fro m the concrete weight coating. The detailed inspection determined that there were no gouges in the pipe wall, al l wel ds were sound and free from defects, and there were no defects or other indications of cracks in the parent pipe. The suspected dents were not confirmed and the divers initially reported n o d ents in th e p ipe. Ho wever, following removal of the concrete coating from the entire pipe joint, further diver i nspection reveal ed a com plex dent ed feature whi ch was confi rmed by det ailed geom etric m apping. The dented area was cent red at about 8 o'cl ock (looking along the pipe away from Teesside) and extended up to the pipe seam weld at around 10 o'clock. Detailed geometric mapping of the area determined th at th e o verall ax ial ex tent o f th e d eformed area was approximately 4 m, Figure 8 . The feature consisted of an oval ised sect ion due t o t he hi gh bendi ng curvature at the peak of t he pul l over , superi mposed on which were two pronounced "dents". The greatest depth of t he two dents was 31 mm at the deepest point.
The geom etry cl osely m atched t he di mensions of t he vessel anchor. The spacing of the two dents was approximately equal t o t he spaci ng of t he anchor flukes while the mid-point between t he t wo dent s m atched t he point of maximum pipe curvature and ovality. Drawings showing the anchor and pipe supported the conclusion t hat t he feat ure had been caused by the anchor hooking on the pipe and pulling it sideways, Figure  9 . Maritime data [1] indicate that the vessel crossed the CATS pipeline while drifting at a speed of around 2 knot s. The kinetic energy of the anchor can be estimated from the effective mass of t he anchor and was of t he order of 10 kJ. In pipeline terms, the impact energy is relatively low, primarily because of the lo w an chor v elocity. This impact energy can be absorbed by typical concrete coatings without affecting the pipe steel [3] . It is likely that the "im pact" dam age (i.e. at the moment of impact b etween an chor an d p ipeline) was lim ited to the concrete coating only. The l ocations of t he t wo dent s, equidistant from the poi nt of m aximum pi peline curvat ure, suggest t hat t he t wo dent s probabl y form ed later due to the same anchor chain tension which induced the lateral movement of the pipeline. The other coating damage along approximately 4 m of pipe may have occurred as t he anchor freed i tself from the pipe.
ASSESSMENT OF THE DAMAGE
Dents in pipelines must be assessed as they m ay result in a reduction i n t he st atic st rength of t he pi peline, and al so a reduction in the fatigue life if the pipeline is subject to pressure cycling.
Static Strength
There is no applicable m ethod i n PDAM for t he assessment of the st atic st rength of a dent cont aining a wel d. PDAM states that dented welds are usual ly repaired and ot her industry guidance (e.g. ASME B31.8S) requires repair. PDAM notes th at th e reaso n fo r this is that "the burst and fatigue strength of a dented weld is difficult to predict and can be significantly lower than that of a plain dent of the same depth, due to the possibility of the weld being damaged (cracked) during the denting process". However PDAM does state that "If it could be established, with confidence, that the dent and the weld did not contain any defects, and that the welds were over-matched and had a high toughness, then it may be reasonable to assess the static strength of a dented weld as though it was a plain dent".
The UT and MPI inspection of the seam weld showed that the wel d cont ained no defect s and pipe material records were available which gave the required confidence that the weld was overmatched and had suf ficient t oughness. Therefore a judgement was m ade that the reported dents could be assessed using t he m ethod recom mended i n PDAM for t he assessment of plain dents.
PDAM st ates t hat pl ain dent s wi th depth less than 7% of the pipe diameter do not af fect t he st atic st rength of t he pipeline. The measured depth of t he deepest dent in the CATS pipeline was 3.4% of di ameter. Possible interaction between the t wo dent s and t he resi dual curvat ure of t he pipe was assumed t o have no ef fect on burst pressure. The assessm ent therefore concluded that the dent was tolerable at MAOP.
Fatigue Strength
PDAM recom mends t hat t he fat igue l ife of a dent containing a weld can be assessed using the method for a pl ain dent with the application of an addi tional factor to account for the presence of the weld. The recommended method determines a stress concentration factor due t o t he geom etry of t he dent and det ermines t he resul ting fat igue l ife usi ng an S-N curve specific to steel pipelines.
Internal pressure data were obtained from the CATS shore terminal showing t he vari ation i n pressure at t he dam age location over the previ ous y ear. These dat a were used t o determine t he pressure cy cling as an i nput t o t he fatigue calculation.
It was noted that the S-N curve used i n t he m ethod recommended in PDAM is specific to pipes tested in air. Given that t he pi pe coat ing had been removed for inspection, the fatigue assessm ent of t he dent was carried out assuming a seawater & CP environment. A correction factor of 2.5 was 7 applied to t he cal culated fat igue l ife t o account for t his difference, in accordance with published guidance [4] .
Using t he PDAM recom mended m ethod, t he rem aining fatigue life of a 31 mm deep dent on t he seam wel d was calculated to be 17 y ears. This was consi dered an upper bound to the fatigue life of the reported damage, as the assessment did not take account of the complex shape of t he feature, including the pipe curvature, the two dents, or the presence of a compressive axial stress. The estimated fatigue life was lower than the remaining design l ife of t he pi peline, and t herefore some form of pi peline repai r or rei nforcement woul d be required, although not necessarily im mediately. A further fatigue check was then perform ed to assess th e fatig ue d ue to the single cy cle of depressuri sation from norm al operat ing pressure down t o 54 bar g and back to normal operating pressure. This check was perform ed using the same PDAM method and i ndicated t hat a subst antial proport ion of the pipeline fat igue l ife woul d be consum ed duri ng t his single depressurisation cy cle. It was therefore decided to repair the damage prior to repressurising the pipeline.
Discussion
The PDAM assessm ent predicted significant fatigue damage due t o onl y one pressure cy cle over onl y half the operating pressure of the pi peline. This conservat ive resul t raised a number of quest ions regardi ng t he appl ication of t he PDAM methodology to dent ed pi pelines wi th wel ds. The methodology includes an empirical factor to take into account the d etrimental ef fect o f th e weld , b ased on results of fatigue tests on pipes without welds and tests on pipe with welds. The location of t he wel d seam i s not defi ned; t he PDAM dat a set simply interprets the weld seam as p resent with in th e d ented shape of t he pipe. Consequently, the assessment considers the dent to be the sam e as a dent wi th a seam or ci rcumferential weld running through its centre.
In the CATS case, the seam weld crossed the periphery of one of the dents. According to PDAM, the dent must therefore be considered as a dent with a weld. Som e finite elem ent analyses were perform ed later to assess the ef fect of the weld location and any i nteraction bet ween t he t wo dent s and t he overall shape of the pipe. Two analyses were attem pted. The first FEA used the as-m easured geom etry of the pipeline and determined the linear elastic st ress concentration factors which were appl icable for subsequent el astic pressure cy cling. The second FEA attempted to model the local elastic-plastic loading history of t he dent ed pi pe and t he subsequent st ress cy cles during pressure cycling. The m ore com plex second anal ysis was ultimately inconclusive, but the simpler first an alysis gave realistic stress co ncentration facto rs at (i) th e lo cation o f th e weld and (i i) the most onerous l ocation within the parent pipe. A convent ional fat igue cal culation was t hen perform ed using these stress concentration factor s and S-N curves for parent pipe and wel ded pi pe. The resul ts gave a greater fatigue life than predicted from the PDAM model.
The two di fferent approaches gi ve di fferent concl usions. The PDAM approach implicitly co nsiders an y sid e-effects o f the denting process, such as changes in material toughness and micro-cracking o f th e p arent p ipe. PDAM also implicitly considers th e o bserved statistical u ncertainty in th e fatigue performance of pipelines with dents. However t hese statistics are based on a relatively lim ited d ata set wh ich m ay b e inapplicable and overl y conservat ive for t he act ual pi peline, dent and wel d l ocation. In cont rast, the FEA approach uses more ap propriate stresses at th e critical weld , b ut relies o n material d ata wh ich m ay n ot n ecessarily represent the actual fatigue resi stance of t he pi pe and wel d after the denting incident, and may be non-conservative. Ultim ately, the comparison bet ween t he t wo methods is inconclusive. However the comparison illustrates the potential benefits which could be obt ained from m ore refined fat igue assessment methods for dented pipelines.
REPAIR & RESTART
It was decided to place a permanent repair over the damage. A grouted sleeve design was selected, see Figure 10 .
The grouted steel sleeve repai r consi sted of a very ri gid steel sleeve, fabricated in hal f-shells, with cem entatious g rout in the annulus between the pipe and sleeve. The grout provides rigid reinforcement to the dented pipeline and prevent s further outwards radial movement of t he dents under pressure cy cling. The sleeve provides structural support only; it is not pressureretaining b ut can with stand the structural loads exerted by the outside of the pipeline during pressurisation.
Figure 10 -Repair Sleeve
A com plex m itred sl eeve was requi red i n order to accommodate the perm anent bend at the peak of the deformed pipe sect ion whi le l imiting t he t hickness of t he annul us and effective flexibility of the grout reinforcement. The sleeve was approximately 4.2 m length with a 6.5 degree m itred elbow at the centre. The clamp included seals at each end to hold the grout during curing. The cl amp desi gn was backed up wi th FEA and st ructural desi gn cal culations t o confirm that the 8 clamp and grout provi ded adequat e rest raint to prevent stress cycling of the pipeline dents.
The clamp was fitted by divers from the DSV Orelia. The lower half of the clamp was located under the pipeline using air bags, and t he upper hal f then lowered down over the pipeline. Once the bolts were m ade up, grout was th en injected into the annulus. Grout samples were ret ained to measure curing rates and confirm that the grout had reached adequate strength.
The pipeline was then put back into operation. The restart was a com plex operat ion whi ch requi red careful management of the liquids which had collected in the pipeline following the depressurisation below t he cri condenbar. The t iming of t he restart and repressurisation was careful ly m anaged t o ensure that the increase in pipeline pressure did not exceed the allowable pressure determined by the curing of the grout within the repair clamp.
The pipeline ret urned i nto norm al operat ion on 1 September. The d amaged sectio n was in itially p rotected b y guard vessel and later rock-dumped for permanent protection.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has present ed a sum mary of the inspection, assessment and repai r of t he C ATS pi peline aft er damage due to an anchor snaggi ng i ncident. The whole exercise was completed in 9 weeks.
Anchor dam age t o of fshore pi pelines can be both severe and complex, and i t is necessary to conduct safety assessments at all stages of the inspecti on, excavation, assessm ent and repair process.
A number of important technical lessons were learned from the incident:
• Observations from in itial v isual su rveys m ay b e misleading. Detailed inspection data are essen tial for the accurate identification and assessment of defects in the pipeline; • The process of snaggi ng and pul l over i nduces a complex stress state in the pipeline. Significant locked-in stresses can be induced; • The hi gh l ocked-in st resses coul d pot entially l ead to failure after the incident.
The size and shape of defects are not known until the inspection is complete. Preliminary safety assessm ents are essential to demonstrate that inspection work can proceed safely; • Methods are requi red t o assess gouges i n pi pelines with significant l ocked-in st resses. Exi sting m ethods can lead to very onerous defect assessments;
• Current methods t o assess fat igue i n dented pipelines may be very conservative. There is scope for further refinement of fatigue assessment methods. Existing pi peline defect assessm ent m ethods are largely based on onshore pi peline pract ice. The CATS pipeline incident has dem onstrated that care i s required when applying these methods to damaged offshore pipelines.
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